The history of human society can be, unfortunately, best 
INTRODUCTION
The defense system in the SFRY was one of the basic subsystems of society. It was developed from the partisan forces and experiences of the People's Liberation Movement (PLM). A lot was invested in the Movement and it was constantly being developed. The Yugoslav National Army (YNA), as its basic element, was a highly respectable military force. Majority of the current key political fi gures still remember those times. Many references have been made in favor of past times.
In the meantime, the SFRY broke down into smaller parts it was made up of. The YNA lasted longer that the country it defended and its capacities were used for the formation of the armies of the subsequent countries on its territory.
The SFRY broke apart in a brutal, military way. It was so brutal that no one ever believed it would be put together again. However, they were wrong. The decrees of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (Dayton Agreement) led to the creation of Yugoslavia in small. Destruction of one multinational community in order to be replaced with another is a political experiment which is, according to many, doomed to failure. One should bear in mind the fact that the Armed Forces of BiH (AF BiH), which were believed to be a positive example and a signpost to other subsystem societies, are nothing more than a poor image of the YNA. Building a perspective, united country is thus additionally hampered with signifi cant, but negative, factors.
After the learned lessons on the SFRY example and its military breakdown, it was expected that the defense system would be looked at with special attention, thoughtfully and carefully. Very soon, ten years after the war, just the opposite happened. Thoughtlessly and carelessly, under the pressure of selfi sh interests and foreign powerful people, the Armed Forces of BiH 2 were formed out of the confronted forces. Promised investments and envisioned system of development saw no light. A lacuna got in the way, in the crossfi re of political turmoil, with continual burdening with legacies, affairs, mediocrities… On top of it all, there is political demilitarization which, as an apple of discord, just confi rms the futility of community.
There was a gradual need for a detailed analysis of the newly created situation. Many realized that "the defense system" required a more constructive approach and an exit strategy from an obviously failed and poorly supported project.
One of the suggestions, which has been present in the public for ten years, is the demilitarization of BiH. Is there any truth in this, sincerity and feasibility given the conditions in this country, is the question which requires a prudent and a well-thought-out answer. Avoiding serious discussion on the matter can be counterproductive. The key aspects of this suggestion need to be reviewed in the light of modern trends and give thoughtful answers.
One of the ways for seeking answers is considering the essential existence of the armed force. War and militarism, along with everything that accompanies them, give unilateral answers in favor of the army, while the peace situation is more complex. Only an entire insight is correct and can give correct and useful answers.
The wars in this region were fought many times. Only the periods of peace lasted longer or shorter. How long this peace will last should not be subjected to any prognosis. Some Serbian politicians stated that there would be no more wars in BiH and thus proposed the concept of demilitarization. The period behind us is not short and it favors those who are active in the process of building peace, and not those who regard it as a permanent state and a category which cannot be endangered.
The peace in BiH is not stable enough to claim that its citizens live and work in a safe environment. When it comes to that, we should not forget how important it is, given the circumstances that rule in the Balkans. It requires a constant and careful monitoring of the state and timely and effi cient measures necessary for dealing with problems. Is there, among these measures, any room for the weakening of military effectiveness and demilitarization? This deserves special consideration and scrutiny.
The aim of this paper is not to answer many questions in the domain of defense. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to identify and defi ne the key elements of the demilitarization issue in BiH, regardless of the value use of suggested solutions proposed by the Declaration.
The paper should shed some light on the issue of war and peace and help direct those in charge of defense and its role in building the sense of protection of the citizens in BiH.
WAR AND MILITARIZATION
In the SFRY, the post-war generations have reached the state of spirit which looks upon war through the: magnifi er of solemn speeches about nurturing tradition, embellished historical facts and partisan movies. For the 1980s generations this is ancient history. Formulated to look appealing and exciting was lightly and uncritically received. The economic as well as the crisis in the functioning of relationships in the state have shifted the focus from war and revolution and put it aside. Former wars were not used as a lesson, nor did they prompt a necessary caution.
The economic crisis, breakdown of the SFRY and the dreadful war destructions in the last two decades of the 20 th century have demonstrated in their full destructive force the danger of superfi cial attitude towards crucial issues. The consequences are such that they will require a lot of time and even more energy to diminish their impact and for social processes to be directed in the positive way. This is why it is necessary for all the activities to be quality designed and implemented in a planned and organized way.
War destructions, the current state BiH is in and the fear of possible repetition of confl icts require a serious approach to this issue.
The essence of war
There are not enough strong reasons to use the term war in this paper in the way Clausewitz and others, classical theoreticians 3 , use it. With respect to historical facts and modern way of thinking, the more acceptable defi nition of war (Vojni leksikon, 1981) is the one which says that war is a "complex, intensive and massive confl ict of states, military-political alliances or different social powers within one state, where massive and organized use of armed violence and confl ict is conducted for the purpose of realizing specifi c political, economic and military goals of classes, states or people".
This defi nition entails all the rudimentary elements of war:
• belligerents, • armed confl ict as a dominant, but not its only trait, • organized and guided forces within unique social structure,
• given time and space • more or less applied tactics and rules of warfare and • clearly defi ned goal.
Confl ict is broader in meaning than war. This means that every confl ict is not war. Confl icts were present in the fi rst community, but, essentially, lacked the characteristics of war. Low level of development, attitude towards nature, community needs and types of confl icts could not generate such a complex phenomenon as war. With the development of society, confl icts became complex too. The appearance of social classes led to the necessary prerequisites for confl ict to take on the characteristic of war. Wars changed in complexity in the history of human society, and unfortunately more frequent. The progress of civilization did not improve the way of dealing with vexed questions. Disputes were resolved less in a "civilized", and more in a military way. There was an increase in the number of wars, which were more complex and destructive, if not in the physical sense, then in the structural one. After the prohibition of wars and the idea of absence of wars, many more have broken out after World War II.
The history of human society can be fully viewed through the history of warfare. There is a widespread belief that the history of society actually represents the history of warfare.
In the meantime, a classical notion of war as a complex social phenomenon and not just an armed confl ict became prevalent. An armed confl ict is the essence of war and the outcome of war greatly rests upon it. Aside from an armed confl ict, war includes political, economic, psychological and other forms of confl ict. Politics 4 lies at the heart of war and it determines the issue of war and peace. Politicians choose opponents and allies. Politics governs social community and military forces. It is political decisions that end war, and after war politics steers social community in a designated direction. Economics provides the necessary military potential and it is responsible for many important military issues. The term "economic warfare" is not uncommon and infrequent. The same applies to psychological-propaganda effects, special war, etc.
War is a planned, organized activity governed by defi ned goals. The planning and preparation is run by politics. Politics holds the key responsibility in warfare, and it directs its infl uence through a specially formed command part of military forces. The desired goal is the ultimate result of war. These are values that are aspired to and want to be preserved. They are particularly important to the holder. These are political, economic, territorial and military goals. They are determined by:
• self-defense, • assume control of a part or the whole territory and the potentials of the opposing side, • annihilation or destruction of the enemy, • reorganization of social community and • gaining a better position in social community.
In simpler words, the aim of war is to impose one's will on the enemy. Such relation between the winner and the defeated makes possible for the winner to realize other military goals.
Aside from the classical interpretation of war, many theoreticians view it as continual confl ict lacking arms. According to them, the main idea is achieving goals. Sometimes it is easier to get greater effects on the opposing side without the use of arms. This is possible for those whose political power exceeds the power of the opponent. History is full of examples which show that this is possible without the use of armed violence. The fi rst who made reference this was Sun Tzu 5 2,500 years ago in his treatise "The Art of War" (Sun Tzu, 2009) .
War is a destructive social phenomenon characterized by devastation and destruction. It destroys the values of man which are the basis of ethical quality of society and most often social order. It destroys human, cultural and material potentials by manipulating the destructiveness of the phenomenon.
Special social relations are established in war in which specifi c roles, and infl uence as well, are given to the authorities that get by easily in war conditions. Upon the end 4 Carl von Clausewitz in his work "On War" states that: "War is a continuation of politics which deploys other means." of war, new social relations emerge. This gives room to people of questionable morality to establish their infl uence in social community. Adjusting war authority to peaceful conditions poses a complex problem.
War is full of negative occurrences, individuals and groups. Aside from devastation and destruction, war favors controversial individuals and groups which cause different problems.
Most often these are war crimes and different forms of crime, damaging of reputation and moral power of the army and people, profi teering, smuggling… Many members of these groups become suspiciously rich and take advantage of this situation after war. The appearance of militarism, no matter how much it is present, ultimately has a negative impact on the efforts of society to deal with numerous problems.
The horrors of World War II and former unsuccessful attempts resulted in the Charter of the United Nations which legally bans a war of aggression, and permits a victim of aggression to defend itself. All new conventions on war law have replaced the term war with the term armed confl ict.
The power of the Charter is great, but not great enough to resolve disputes in international relations within complex social communities. Many wars which were waged after the adoption of the Charter testify to this fact. Therefore, wars, although prohibited, still continue to exist.
Militarism
It is safe to say that soldiers dominate in war and this is viewed, given the circumstances, by society with understanding and support. The degree of militarism gets high. This, ultimately, becomes a problem which generates other problems. It leads to a state of confusion in which negative phenomena surface. This is an inevitable manifestation. It is destructive and it requires a broader elaboration. Militarism 6 is often manifested through disproportional empowering of the army and fl eet for the purpose of showing aggression to other countries and antidemocratic pressure in one's own country (Vojna enciklopedija, Vol. 5, pp. 587, 1962) . One of the manifestations of militarism is the tendency of transferring military notion and relations onto civilians and, in general, onto the entire social relations at the expense of democratic rights and freedoms of citizens.
Essentially, this is an aggressive and reactionary phenomenon deployed by the ruling circles in some countries, especially in Prussia. Like any phenomenon, based on historical facts on crises and wars, militarism had its ups and downs.
Militarism always generates antimilitarism which is most often expressed in the fi ght against the army in favor of militia and against excessive strengthening of military power. This was construed as disproportional infl uence of the military factor on the political life of the country and aggressiveness in foreign policy. The fi ght for peace and the development of democracy in the world, combined with other factors, weakens the 6 The term militarism (French militarisme, German Militarismus and Russian Милитаризм) appears in the 1960s of the 19th century in order to mark superiority of military circles and army in state and social life of some countries.
infl uence of militarism. Its fi nal descend from the historical scene is linked to the absence of wars as a means of solving domestic and foreign issues.
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The way of formation of the SFRY can be regarded as a surprise, but the war in BiH surprised only those who "had overslept" the previous events. Unfortunately, some of these included people in high positions.
The war in BiH started as a logical continuation of international confl icts and fi ghts for independence of republics-states on the territory of the former SFRY. The crisis that engulfed this part of the Balkans was already internationalized, so the infl uence of big powers on the events in BiH was more and more present from day to day.
What was exactly happening in this region at the end of the last century? By generalizing some elements of the war in BiH, one can notice its conventional characteristics and clear traits of interior confl icts. Observed through the prism of the UN Charter, it was a tragic domestic armed confl ict with a high degree of involvement of foreign factors. We were the witnesses of that, in a cruel way and by paying a high price, what is forbidden or called by another name did not automatically seize to exist. Putting the events into the classical framework of confl ict, we had a war waged with conventional arms. Some regarded it as a fi ght for survival, others saw it as an aggression, still others construed it as a domestic armed confl ict. In any case, it was a war. Viewed from the formal-legal aspect, three sides were involved in the confl ict -the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniaks in the form of the Republic of Srpska, "Republic BiH" 7 and Herzeg Bosnia. In effect, the situation was far more complex than that. The YNA, as an armed force of the then "truncated SFRY" (since April 27, 1992) in the form of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had abandoned BiH until May 19, 1992. Up until then, it had been executing its constitutional obligations by leading an armed fi ght for the protection of people and state territory and its own forces, means and capacities. Although they were the allies in the fi ght against the Republic of Srpska, from 1993 to 1994, in central Bosnia and in the valley of Neretva, the Croats and the Bosniaks fought each other. During that period the Serbs protected the Croats. The alliance, however, did not change in the other parts of BiH. During 1994-1995, on the majority of the area of Velika Kladuša, there was Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia whose forces were the allies of Republic of Srpska. The units of the Croatian Army were active the whole time of war on the territory of BiH, which means that this can be regarded as aggression. The UNPROFOR forces were not unbiased according to their mission and they, on some occasions, deployed arms in the fi ght against the ARS and on the infrastructure of the RS. NATO forces conducted their own operations with and without the mandate of the Security Council against the ARS and the RS. This issue deserves special multi-disciplinary elaboration, but for the purpose of this paper this is enough.
The armed confl ict was a dominant, but not the defi ning factor of the war. Other features were also very important:
• political fi ght, 7
The Bosniaks wanted to keep the continuity of republic-state and thus try to realize their war goals.
• media war, • economic war, • psychological-propaganda infl uence, • military help and • information support.
Some things had its continuity, while others would sometimes take place. Their intensity and infl uence on the development of situation fl uctuated during the war. Due to special signifi cance of the armed forms of confl ict, they need to be dealt with in more academic papers. But in this paper, it is enough to point out that the things which had an immense impact on the course of the war and the balance of powers are:
• When it comes to the leadership of forces, things tend to get complicated here. International law recognizes command responsibility and accepts factual state in the fi eld. Each of the abovementioned confronted sides had its governing and command structure. Some additional things consisted of tutorship and mentoring, which played an important part in military decision-making. The USA had a prominent role by hiring private companies for military consultation and support. Besides this, they also directly deployed their own capacities as a backup for planning and carrying out operations. The area on which some of these operations and activities were carried out extended the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was determined by:
• areas used for target actions in BiH, • centers in which decisions were made, • areas used for armed actions.
It is very diffi cult to determine the length of war due to different interpretations of its essence. Special attention needs to be paid to the attitudes of the belligerents about the commencement of military operations and the period of implementation of the military part of the Dayton Agreement. One anecdote says that "war begins when in all the news report on numbers of victims instead of individual cases".
When it comes to warfare tactics the following springs up:
• lack of storms, • line-trench defense,
• fi rearms and intelligence support, • positioning and protection of civilians and • importance of former military knowledge and experiences in operations.
The law was not suffi ciently applied in the armed confl ict. Everything was based on the conscience of the individual, and less on the defi ned political relation. One may question the importance of warfare rules of the authorities and institutions.
No side achieved the war goals in full. The Serbs fought for the survival on their ancestral home, but lost a lot of their territory. The Croats fought for Croatia which would span to the Drina and Zemun, but failed. The Bosniaks feel that the Serbs have Serbia, the Croats have Croatia, and that Bosnia belongs to them. They do not speak of Herzegovina to them know reasons. Some western countries have managed to create a polygon for political experiments and get a good basis for further actions, which means they are the only ones who can be satisfi ed with accomplished results. Only the situation in BiH is an eyesore which prevents them from receiving worldwide admiration. All this leads to the conclusion that the war on the territory of BiH is not over yet. It is not a classical war, an armed confl ict, for there is no armed fi ght, but there are fi erce, other forms of dominant political fi ght for accomplishing previously set goals. This can be seen in the division of territory, collapse of vital interests and transfer of authority. It is reasonable to say that vital interests, in principle, are the values fought for and about. Whether it is an armed or not an armed confl ict is less important. What are the defense measures and the scope of "the defender", is a question which is not easy to answer. It is not something impossible and diffi cult, since the consequences require defense in an adequate way. Militarism was not present enough to pose a threat to the social governing system, not even during the war. This is why different forms of animosity towards the ARS, and later towards the AF BiH, seem strange. Viewed in the framework of present time, this phenomenon is isolated and it is attributed solely to the politics of some Serbian parties. Unfortunately, the most infl uential political parties. When it comes to the opposing sides, and this region, the issue does not have the same magnitude. The militarism in RS manifested itself in the following way:
• society was oriented toward military forces and values,
• civil values lost its signifi cance, • some military authority fi gures rose to abnormal prominence, • military decision-making strongly infl uenced civil decision-making.
The results were unexpected and disproportional. It is worth pointing out that:
• civil-military antagonisms were created, • preserving such state was of importance, • political countermeasures were deployed which, ultimately, very soon resulted in abolition of its own military force and the basis for the creation of a new one.
Since there is a strong reaction to nothing, it is necessary to think about its true background and goals. In doing so, the following deserves attention:
• The answers to these and similar questions would enable a useful and acceptable defense policy than the one applied now.
PEACE AND DEMILITARIZATION
The 
The main problems of peace
Peace is a state defi ned by the absence of war. It is a period of time between two wars. Peace is an antithesis to war. It is the desired state of society in which it can prosper. According to the international law, it is a state where all disputes are resolved without the use of armed violence. Further elaboration on countless defi nitions of the term is a matter of special sciences, and the abovementioned defi nition will serve the purpose for this paper.
Building peace is a very complex process. Primarily because of the importance and level of numerous goals which need to achieved. For BiH, additional complication poses the fact that the opposing sides should achieve these goals with joint efforts in a united social community. All in all, successfully completed periods are behind us: end of aggression, stabilization of peace and implementation of most of decrees in the Dayton Agreement. Unfortunately, taking into consideration all the terms, it is diffi cult to choose the one which entirely summarizes the current situation in BiH. It is diffi cult to say whether this is a state of frozen confl ict, incomplete peace, peace, something else or a little bit of everything. The best thing is to use the offi cial term "period of building peace". Hence, the peace in BiH is still being built and it is not complete.
Other things which are debatable are:
• Neither side is satisfi ed. Dissatisfaction can lead to new confl icts.
• Neither side accomplished their war goals. It is reasonable to say that all sides will try to accomplish them in peace. This puts strain on peace.
• The quality of peace lies in satisfying life quality of the citizens and development typical of more developed part of social community. This is still not visible, while other very important processes are directed in the wrong way.
• Everyone wants peace, satisfaction, prosperity. After the initial euphoria and serious analysis we are left with those who think that peace is priceless and those who rely upon limits.
Why is this still a burning question is something that science has not been able to explain yet, but the outlines of answers can be found in the following:
• It was very important to end war and give chance to peace. The price of that was less important at the time. Dilemmas appeared only later. • The energy put into the war was used for its completion or its external support. The latter brought with itself hidden dangers that surfaced only later.
• Foreign factor became the key element with its own interests which could not be achieved in correct peace but by maintaining potential crisis until more favorable solutions appeared as a fi nal solution, a dominant one, working in its own interest. The chance given to peace in this region can be used positively. A lot of energy of another kind is needed to do this, an energy which recognizes tolerance, wisdom, patience, consensus… The times behind us are full of arguments which lead to the conclusion that this chance was not used in its full potential, but that there is always hope.
Reforms of the defense system in BiH
The word reform comes from Latin which means "transformation" (Mala enciklopedija 3, 1978, p. 58). This is reorganization for the purpose of improvement and mending. The biggest transformation that BiH has gone through is in the fi eld of social organization. Socialist way of governing was replaced by capitalist one. The volume of transition and a low quality of coping with new social relations generated a wide specter of problems which particularly refl ected themselves in basic areas, the foundations of every society. All the other reforms conducted in BiH directly depend on or serve the abovementioned ones. They were all supposed to be based on the Dayton Agreement. Many of them are, but some of them were imposed forcefully. This generated another set of problems and additionally burdened the process of building peace. Imposed reforms were not primarily aimed at improving the current situation, but strengthening the central government. This further empowered the advocates of decentralization and forced the other side to openly protest.
Reforms in the defense system were executed in a rather complex situation. Some of them were necessary, while others were extorted. It is important to point out that this social system plays an important part in states of emergency and war, while it has more or less marginalized role in peace. It is also worth mentioning that the peace in BiH, narrow and broader surroundings, is far from being considered guaranteed peace.
Postwar demobilization was done in order to transit from the state of war to the state of peace and the state of diminished mobility of some parts of the armed forces. This is a normal and necessary step typical of the end of war and is not construed as a reform in classical sense.
Developments regarding the defense system of the Republic of Srpska during 1997 are untypical, but have signifi cance in the consideration of reforms and compared to the demilitarization policy in BiH. From the aspect of reforms, radical personnel changes were carried out, the process of abandoning the YNA and war legacy was initiated and specifi c improvements were planned. From the aspect of demilitarization planners, entropy of military professionalism was initiated at the expense of politically suitable per-sonnel, experimental engagement of police 8 was executed in military assignments and "a virus of destruction" was planted in the ARS. These actions were perceived as a political impact on the Army and they deserve special attention. "Locker's Reform" 9 of the BiH defense system was designed to generate solutions which would enable BiH to join the Partnership for Peace. The Commission proposed a solution in 2004 which all three sides found relatively satisfactory. The implementation of the solution, essentially, implies abolishment of entities and cantonal ministries of defense and formation of joint Ministry of Defense BiH. At the end of the painstaking work of the Commission and its teams and partial implementation of the reached agreement, the reform was declared unsuccessful. As it was explained, it had a systematic error. It was obvious that, in the meantime, a more profi table agreement was "reached" in some political circles and that the way to centralized defense system and formation of joint Armed Forces was open. The Serbian government yield to Ashdown's pressure.
In December 2004, the High Representative of the international community for BiH, Paddy Ashdown 10 , formed a new Defense Reform Commission. The cochairmen of the Commission were Dr. Raffi Gregorian 11 and the Minister of Defense BiH, Nikola Radovanović. It took only six months for the Commission to coordinate solutions of unifi ed defense system of BiH governed by the Law on Defense of BiH and the Law on Service in the AF BiH. With the implementation of these solutions, dated 1 January 2006, the entity armies were shut down.
Only ten years after the war, the ARS, as a respectable military force which played an important part in the creation and defense of the Republic of Srpska, was not able to impose itself on the Serbian political establishment. The signifi cant immovable property it owned was at disposal to others, it was tarnished by framed scandals and shut down, which is not stipulated by the Dayton Agreement unless a specifi c agreement is reached. The explanation of this act lies in the fact that there will be no more wars in this region. This form of attitude is still advocated by some Serbian politicians, which calls for evaluation of political reality in the light of current events.
An enormous step taken in the last defense reform poses a risk which still has not met expectations. It did not launch the euphoric centralization of BiH, so the defense system remained in the crossfi re, exposed to constant impacts of political storms. tain military machines. The obligation has an international-legal character and it is most often regulated by agreement on truce or peace. In this way the situation on mainland is controlled, while special rules are applied for air space and coast belt. In broader, political sense, demilitarization (Mala enciklopedija, 1978) , 12 in principle, represents the process of diminishment and elimination of military infl uence on civilian governing of society. There are no known examples of successfully implemented demilitarization by either of the opposing sides or single parts of territory in a confl ict. The war in BiH was an attempt to demilitarize some zones. On 16 April 1993 an UNPRO-FOR commander, French general Philippe Morillon, declared Srebrenica a UN protected zone (UN Security Council Resolution 819). As of 6 May 1993 the Resolution declared the areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, Bihać and Srebrenica demilitarized zones under the UN protection. It is generally known that they were never demilitarized, and the military forces in these areas did not decrease their military actions. Unfortunately, the other side took advantage of its position at the international level and the concurrence of goals with those of the USA, Germany, Great Britain and other NATO state members, to deploy military provocations and force the ARS to respond adequately, further escalating the situation. The outcome was the NATO military intervention against the RS.
DECLARATION ON STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA IN THE DEFENSE SYSTEM
On 18 March 2005 the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska (NARS), on the initiative of the Caucus to the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (AISD), adopted the Declaration 13 on Strategic Commitments of the RS in the defense system. This took place at the time when the Defense Reform Commission was in force to which the same convocation of the NARS gave a unanimous approval for transferring defense authority from entity to state level. The outcome of the Commission's efforts was abolition of entity and formation of united AF BiH. It is clear that the primary goal of the proposers was to infl uence the electorate, and the secondary goal was an attempt to control the Commission. Given the decision-making process at the BiH level, which the Declaration proposers and the MPs to NARS were aware of, it seems that this initiative, aside from being an opinion and a proposal, serves at the same time for distancing from previous efforts.
The subsequent declaration and politics which came out of it did not shut down military capacities until 2007, but the initiative still serves as a guiding idea in the BiH defense system. The President of the Republic of Srpska (RS), Milorad Dodik, launched an initiative on 8 October 2012 for demilitarization of BiH seconded by the RS Government and the NARS. The initiative was coordinated with the Declaration. For the fi rst time, since the formation of the AF BiH, the President Dodik publically admitted that the reform was not in accordance with the Dayton Agreement but was a fruit of the pressure of the international community, i.e. the High Representative at the time, Ashdown. After this reaction, and later on frequent statements of the RS offi cials, it is clear that demilitarization policy is here to stay and that is governed by the Declaration decrees.
The essence of the Declaration
The Declaration itself offers a concept of the BiH defense system. It is not defi ned in detail, which is not necessary for this kind of act. The basis for the idea of shutting down its own military capacities in BiH or reducing them to minimum was defi ned swiftly and superfi cially. This diminished the quality of upgrading it at the start. This particularly relates to the idea that "democratic states do not fi ght each other".
The essence of the Declaration comes down to:
• shutting down its own military capacities, • redirecting released funds and • footing in the defense against: NATO guarantees and the Signatories to the Dayton Agreement and police forces.
As an idea 14 , the stances in the Declaration possess a potential for further thinking and elaboration, but they are partly burdened with unrealistic stands, and some of them are directly collided. It is particularly diffi cult to fi nd historical basis for these kinds of refl ection. When it comes to one of the most essential needs of the people and social community to feel protected, this kind of risk is maybe acceptable for the individual, but not for the people.
This "idea" has been present in the public almost 10 years so the refl ections about it were thoroughly and clearly formulated and argued. Since the defense system is centralized, the refl ections coming from the RS are less important. It is important what foreign and military-political analysts and politicians from the BiH Federation think. They, for the most part, claim that is not possible to join the NATO and the EU without the AF. They believe that it is not the right time for one such reform and that the BiH demilitarization policy is populist, frivolous and unrealistic. This undoubtedly shows that the Declaration suggestions will not be taken into consideration, let alone accepted in the 14 An idea (Mala enciklopedija, 1978 ) is a fi gure, a form; the term with an indefi nite number of meanings comprises everything what is not directly given in reality, but is created in the human spirit and is a product of the human spirit: 1. a thought, a notion about something, a concept of something which is between a live presentation and an abstract notion and is used to express or refl ect something; any cognitive experience, regardless whether it is direct or indirect; 2. an invention, that what is created in the human spirit as a creation of imagination, and it is realized in different ways in different areas of human creativity (art, science, philosophy, industry, technology and everyday life), as well as a process creation which has a symbolic and representative function; 3. a project, blueprint, vision of something that does not exist, but can (an idea for the reform of society, education, etc.); 4. an attitude in the sense of given opinion, a view in the sense of specifi c spiritual orientations and understanding.
near future. All the efforts of turning this idea into a concrete project and starting with its realization were in vain. Lack of operationalization has, primarily, turned this well-intentioned idea into Utopia 15 . One must admit that decentralized BiH free of confl icts and wars sounds good. Advocating something like this is not out of malice. However, putting aside the real, political function of the Declaration, its contents is interpreted as it is. It is not diffi cult to see the unreality and the impossibility of suggested solutions. This Utopian vision of the transformation of BiH is not in accordance with previous experiences, but it could be realized in new, changed conditions and circumstances. Thus, working on their changes comes in the foreground.
Given the fact that there have not been any attempts about the consideration of suggested solutions, a number of Serbian politicians turned the notion and "vision" of transformation of BiH into sort of guidelines for political demilitarization. Viewed from this time reference, it is clear that demilitarization policy is favored by the people, especially the people in the RS. Especially the viewpoint about redirecting funds. It is not unlikely that BiH will go through this transformation but its realistic planning is still nowhere in sight. It is in the interest of all relevant factors in and related to BiH (or should be) to create such social community in which military capacities would not exist. The interest is not different, but the ideas about getting one such community defi nitely are. Thus this "idea" is construed as Utopian. However, by putting aside the physical part of demilitarization, the question remains what to do with the militarized people's awareness in this region. How to demilitarize the minds of soldiers, policemen, sports rifl emen, hunters, or worse, criminals, Vehabias, terrorists…?
Problems that hinder demilitarization
If we were to conduct a serious evaluation of the situation in the functioning of BiH demilitarization policy, we would reach the following, general, conclusions:
• The entire world is, hypothetically speaking, militarized, both in physical and psychological sense. There are no global considerations about general demilitarization. The world has for a long time been a public scene where general state has infl uence on specifi c areas and vice versa. This applies to BiH too. Any attempt for changes without general approval does not guarantee success.
• The situation in the narrower and wider surroundings is burdened with a lot of disputes. The Euro-Atlantic integrations are ongoing processes, which have a positive effect on building peace and good neighborly relations. Supporting these processes would have a direct, favorable impact on the process itself and demilitarization as an ultimate state.
• The situation in BiH is no such to take serious considerations about demilitarization. It is a situation of an unfi nished confl ict where there are still forces that contemplate about the chances for the realization of previously set war goals. In this kind of situation caution is an essential need.
• There is no honest and serious attitude toward the issues of jeopardizing security, on the one hand, and the defense issues, on the other. There is no lack in wisdom, but the focus and honesty can be challenged. It is necessary and possible to change this.
• The state of the defense system is below required level and it continues to collapse. At the same time, there is no clear political stand and idea of what wants to be accomplished with this system. Authorized institutions and individuals have to be clearly defi ned for the purpose of further development of this very important, useful, effi cient and necessary part of society. Suggested alternatives are not the solution.
• The BiH territory poses an auspicious starting point for the emergence of crisis and endangering the safety of citizens. The stronger the awareness about this fact, the greater the chance of timely and effi cient countermeasures.
When it comes to the Declaration and the solutions in it, the following is disputable:
• Who and how deals with the issues that can be infl uenced? In this case, the effects are counterproductive. It is not fair, due to insuffi cient opportunities for dealing with basic human issues, to redirect attention from them to "the scapegoat" -the defense system. • Superfi cial attitude toward serious issues. A sober and responsible thinking and approach is expected of authorized institutions and individuals. The given in relation to demilitarization policy points to a similar approach to more important, life, issues. • Every social community has a need for specifi c forces, special means and high level of willingness to respond to specifi c situations. The role of the army is irreplaceable here. Police forces can faintly compete with the level of knowledge, skills and operational skills for executing extra, very complex tasks in the fi eld of territorial defense. • Pacifi sm is not much of a solution. Making a state dependent on the will of the opposing side or a situation where somebody else has to defend it is irresponsible.
• There have been cases of redistribution of approved funds, but there is no economic and social logics like the one in the Declaration. It is not to be expected that any of this will signifi cantly change in the near future.
CONCLUSION
Although wars are prohibited by the UN Charter, they continue to break out. They are waged because of interests and values, which can be obtained without an armed confl ict. Thus, the courage and readiness of soldiers who defend these values in an armed confl ict compared to soldiers who defend them in peace are viewed equally. Due to difference in type of sacrifi ce, politicians ore obliged to braver defense against attacks and a more responsible governing of social community. The war in BiH (the armed part) was ended with the Dayton Agreement. The outcome is a state which does not suit any of the constitutional people. Neither of the opposing sides realized their previously set war goals, hence the fi ght for them in peace changed only in form. It was continued, admittedly, with a lower intensity and well camoufl aged and effi cient forms of armed confl ict for the centralization of BiH, abolishment of entities and Bosniak dominance. The state of peace does not guarantee the protection of its citizens in full sense. The reforms being implemented are aimed at the centralization of BiH, not the improvement of the situation. The defense system reform has put the maturity and courage of the RS politicians on test. They are not strong enough to contribute to and defend the RS. They yielded to pressure and they renounced their own military force, the ARS. Since they failed to defend the ARS, it was not to be expected that they would defend the united AF BiH. "The exit" lies in demilitarization policy. The Serbs did portray militarism to that extent so it would generate antimilitarism, which would lead to strategic commitment against military capacities. It is a consequence of lack of political courage, the state of internal (civilian-military) relations and reckless attitudes. BiH demilitarization is an idea since it represents a vision of something that does not exist. The vision of highly positioned persons in the main social institutions should not be disputed lightly, and just the opposite is true. Seven years given for the deadline of realization of this idea is long enough to abandon or revise it. None of the aforementioned took place, which has made it susceptible to dispute. A Utopian idea is not good enough to be put into operation. The envisioned state of peace and prosperity of society in which everybody is protected and satisfi ed seems nice and attractive, but it is far away and blurred. Undefi ned or general ways of realization of suggestions are removing it from reality and bringing it closer to Utopia. An extra problem poses the opposition and degradation of the Croats and Bosniaks. However, there are also hidden dangers here, and they should be avoided. The fact is that the BiH citizens are gradually becoming accustomed to fi ctitious solutions and ideas. One more or less does not pose a problem, but it becomes one when it turns into a critical mass and society "hits a dead end", without the possibility for prosperity.
The solutions in the Declaration (putting people and society in a state of defense dependant on guarantees, foreign military forces and own faulty organization of the defense forces) are not good. The suggestion is typical of radical changes. In order to be accepted in the amount required for decision-making, it is necessary to get an acceptable explanation and conduct a quality campaign. Both these parts are left out which means, in principle, that the current situation in BiH is not disputed. It is clear that the stances in the Declaration have become the guidelines in some political options in the RS for governing demilitarization policy and a form of a daily-political combination used as distraction from more importnat, but intractable, existential problems of the citizens.
